CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-18417

MediumCVSS 6.5
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.18%

6th percentile - higher than 6% of all known CVEs

Summary

In Zephyr RTOS, a vulnerability exists in the BSD socket layer where an asynchronous error was stored in the user_data field of the network context, which for listening TCP sockets is used to store a pointer to the parent context. In v4.3.0, after an interface-down event, the accept callback was not disarmed, leading to reuse of the poisoned value as a pointer and writes to an invalid address, causing a kernel fatal error (device crash or reset).

Risk Assessment

An attacker who can repeatedly force a network interface down (e.g., by disrupting a wireless link) or with local/physical access can cause a denial of service (device crash or reset). The vulnerability does not allow direct code execution but can be used to destabilize the system.

Recommendation

Immediately update Zephyr RTOS to a version containing the fix (v4.3.1 or later, or a version with commit 269cb8823d3 / 913fae5169425550f2364655298fceb79b320066). If updating is not possible, restrict access to network interfaces and monitor link-down events.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr RTOS

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

The native BSD-socket layer recorded a pending asynchronous socket error by type-punning it into struct net_context's void user_data field (ctx->user_data = INT_TO_POINTER(-status) in zsock_accepted_cb(), zsock_received_cb(), zsock_connected_cb() and zsock_close_ctx() in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_inet.c), reading it back with POINTER_TO_INT(). That same field is owned by the network stack for listening TCP contexts: net_tcp_accept() stores the parent context pointer there and the TCP core passes it back to the registered accept callback. A failed accept therefore left a small integer (an errno value) where the stack expected a struct net_context . When the network interface carrying a listening TCP socket goes down, close_tcp_conn() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c invokes the accept callback with -ENETDOWN and the context's user_data. In v4.3.0 the callback was not disarmed afterwards, so a second interface-down event forwarded the previously stored errno to zsock_accepted_cb(), which dereferenced it as the parent context and performed several stores through it (sock_set_error()'s read-modify-write of socket_data, k_fifo_cancel_wait(&parent->recv_q)) — the crash described in the fix's commit message. v4.3.1 and v4.4.x carry a later change clearing conn->accept_cb after the error callback (269cb8823d3 on the v4.3 branch, 913fae5169425550f2364655298fceb79b320066 on main), which closes that repeat path; on those releases the poisoned cookie remains reachable only by a narrower race, a handshake completing alongside the interface-down still passing the stale cookie to k_fifo_put(&parent->accept_q, ...), and by getsockopt(SO_ERROR), which reads the field back unconditionally. On v4.3.0 an application that keeps a listening TCP socket open across repeated link-down events is sufficient to reach the defect; the triggering condition is a network-interface state change, not attacker-supplied packet data, so the practical attacker is one able to force the link down repeatedly (for example an adjacent attacker disrupting a wireless link) or one with local/physical access. Because both the faulting address and the stored data are fixed small constants derived from the errno value, the outcome is a wild-pointer access leading to a kernel fatal error — a denial of service (device crash or reset) rather than an attacker-directed memory corruption. The fix stores the pending error in a dedicated net_context.sock_error field and converts every producer and consumer to sock_set_error()/sock_get_error(), leaving user_data untouched. As a side effect it also stops getsockopt(SO_ERROR) — which is evaluated unconditionally — from returning the kernel address held in user_data to a userspace application.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS