CVE-2026-18036
HighCVSS 8.2Summary
A side-channel vulnerability exists in the NTRU implementation of Bouncy Castle for Java before version 1.86. The reduction of secret values using the % operator in three helper functions causes execution time to depend on the secret operand (division by a variable), potentially allowing an attacker to recover information about the NTRU private key through timing measurements.
Risk Assessment
An attacker able to measure cryptographic operation timings may recover information about the NTRU private key, compromising confidentiality. This affects environments using NTRU for key exchange or encryption.
Recommendation
Update Bouncy Castle for Java to version 1.86 or later. The new version replaces division with masking and division-free fold-and-select operations, eliminating the timing dependency.
Other vulnerabilities in Bouncy Castle for Java
See all- CVE-2026-17507High
In the MLS implementation (RFC 9420) of Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the uint32 leaf_index is stored as a signed int, allowing a wire value with the top bit set to decode as a negative number. Incorrect comparison in GroupKeySet.SecretTree.hasLeaf and Group.validateRemove allows bypassing membership checks, potentially leading to a DoS attack via unbounded growth of the node list and JVM heap exhaustion.
- CVE-2023-33201Medium
Bouncy Castle for Java before version 1.74 is affected by an LDAP injection vulnerability. This vulnerability affects applications that use an LDAP CertStore from Bouncy Castle to validate X.509 certificates, where the certificate's Subject Name is inserted into an LDAP search filter without proper escaping.
Original NVD description (English source)
In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, NTRU reduced secret values with the % operator in three helpers whose reference implementations are deliberately division-free, so each reduction was carried out by an integer division whose latency depends on the secret operand. Polynomial.modQ divided by a variable divisor, which a compiler cannot strength-reduce to a multiply the way it can a constant one, so it emitted a division on every call including on the decapsulation path where the dividend derives from the private key; Polynomial.mod3 and NTRUSampling.mod3 divided the secret key polynomials f and g during key generation, the message polynomials r and m during encapsulation, and coefficients recovered during decapsulation. An attacker able to measure that timing can recover information about the NTRU private key. modQ now masks, which is exact because q is always a power of two, and mod3 uses the reference implementation's division-free fold and select; the results are unchanged.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS

