CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-16514

MediumCVSS 4.3
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.24%

15th percentile - higher than 15% of all known CVEs

Summary

The gptp_mi_qualify_announce() function in Zephyr's gPTP subsystem processes received Announce messages by comparing clock identities. The comparison loop uses an attacker-controlled step count (steps_removed) instead of the actual number of TLV entries, leading to an out-of-bounds read. A single frame can cause about 2KB of overread, potentially crashing the networking RX thread and causing denial of service.

Risk Assessment

Risk includes denial of service in deployments with the optional CONFIG_NET_GPTP module (TSN/AVB). The attack requires layer-2 adjacency but no authentication, potentially disrupting critical real-time systems.

Recommendation

Apply the fix that limits reads to the actual TLV entry count (tlv.len / 8). If not possible, disable CONFIG_NET_GPTP where it is not essential.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr RTOS

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

gptp_mi_qualify_announce() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/gptp/gptp_mi.c walks the Path Trace TLV of a received IEEE 802.1AS Announce message, comparing each clock identity against the local one. The loop bound was taken solely from the attacker-controlled wire field announce->steps_removed (accepted up to 254), never from announce->tlv.len, which is the field that states how many identities the TLV actually carries. Because path_sequence is the flexible member of the wire TLV (struct gptp_path_trace_tlv) and GPTP_ANNOUNCE() yields a raw pointer into the received packet buffer, the memcmp() inside the loop can address memory well past the end of the received frame. The stack's only length validation, GPTP_ANNOUNCE_CHECK_LEN(), requires the received gPTP payload to be exactly 68 + tlv.len bytes — so it does not constrain the loop, it guarantees the data is absent. An unauthenticated attacker on the same Ethernet segment can send a single Announce frame declaring tlv.len = 0 with steps_removed = 254; the frame passes the length check and reception path (net_gptp_recv() → gptp_handle_msg() → gptp_mi_qualify_announce()), which performs no authentication, and the loop then reads 255 entries of 8 bytes each — about 2 KB — beyond the end of the network buffer. The impact is an out-of-bounds read. The bytes read are only used as a memcmp() operand and are never returned to the attacker, so there is no meaningful information disclosure; the practical risk is that the overread crosses a network buffer pool boundary into unmapped or MPU-protected memory and faults the networking RX thread, causing a denial of service. Exposure is limited to builds that enable the opt-in, experimental CONFIG_NET_GPTP (TSN/AVB deployments) and to attackers with layer-2 adjacency, since gPTP frames are sent to a link-local multicast address and are not routed. The fix computes the true entry count as tlv.len / GPTP_CLOCK_ID_LEN and rejects the announce when steps_removed + 1 exceeds it, so the loop can no longer run past the data the packet-length check proved present.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS