CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-15924

MediumCVSS 5.9
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.31%

24th percentile - higher than 24% of all known CVEs

Summary

Zephyr's TLS socket layer (subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_tls.c) keeps a process-global client_cache array of cached client session buffers shared by every TLS socket, with access serialized only by the per-socket ctx->lock mutex. Because CONFIG_NET_SOCKETS_TLS_MAX_CLIENT_SESSION_COUNT defaults to 1, two concurrent client sockets contend for the same slot, causing a use-after-free read and a double-free when two saves evict the same entry. This corrupts the mbedTLS heap; the fix adds a dedicated session_cache_lock mutex taken across every accessor of client_cache.

Risk Assessment

Exploitation requires an application that opts into the TLS_SESSION_CACHE socket option (off by default) and runs concurrent TLS client connections on multiple threads. A malicious or compromised server can raise session-ticket frequency to widen the race window, leading to a crash or heap corruption (denial of service).

Recommendation

Update Zephyr to a version containing the fix that adds the session_cache_lock mutex. If updating is not possible, disable the TLS_SESSION_CACHE socket option or avoid concurrent multi-threaded TLS client connections with session caching.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

Zephyr's TLS socket layer in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_tls.c keeps a single process-global array, client_cache, of cached client sessions that is shared by every TLS socket context. The functions that mutate and read it — tls_session_save(), tls_session_get(), tls_session_cache_reset(), and the settings restore handler — allocate, free, and dereference each entry's heap buffer (entry->session). Before the fix these accesses were serialized only by the per-socket context mutex ctx->lock (assigned per socket in ctx_set_lock()), which provides no mutual exclusion between different sockets touching the shared cache. Because CONFIG_NET_SOCKETS_TLS_MAX_CLIENT_SESSION_COUNT defaults to 1, any two concurrent client sockets contend for the same slot. A thread in tls_session_get() reading entry->session inside mbedtls_ssl_session_load() can run concurrently with another thread in tls_session_save() that selects the same entry for reuse and executes mbedtls_free(entry->session) before reallocating — a use-after-free read, and a double-free when two saves evict the same entry. Both corrupt the mbedTLS heap. The cache is reached on ordinary client paths: at connect time via tls_session_store()/tls_session_restore(), and (on main) whenever a TLS 1.3 session ticket arrives during recv()/poll() via tls_session_store_current(). Exploitation requires an application that opts into per-socket client session caching (the TLS_SESSION_CACHE socket option, off by default) and runs concurrent TLS client connections on multiple threads; the timing that opens the window is influenced by the remote peer(s), so a malicious or compromised server can raise session-ticket frequency to widen it. The reliably-demonstrable impact is memory corruption leading to a crash or heap corruption (denial of service). The fix adds a dedicated session_cache_lock mutex taken across every accessor of client_cache, serializing all reads and frees and closing the race.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS