CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-14986

MediumCVSS 6.8
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.18%

8th percentile - higher than 8% of all known CVEs

Summary

The ITE it51xxx I2C driver, when acting as an I2C target (slave) in buffer mode, copies host-supplied write data into a fixed-size buffer (default 256 bytes) without a pre-write bounds check. The running index data->w_index accumulates across FIFO-fill interrupts and is reset only on STOP or timeout, so a single write transaction longer than the buffer causes an out-of-bounds write. The flaw is triggered by a malicious or misbehaving I2C master on the same bus.

Risk Assessment

The vulnerability allows an out-of-bounds write driven from the I2C bus, which can crash the controller or, with attacker-controlled values and length, be shaped toward code execution in the target's kernel/firmware context. No software privilege on the victim is required; only access to the I2C bus is needed.

Recommendation

Update the driver to a version that adds a pre-write bounds check in target_i2c_fifo_read_to_buf() (the fix aborts and resets the FIFO before any out-of-bounds store). Until patched, consider disabling CONFIG_I2C_TARGET_BUFFER_MODE or isolating the I2C bus from untrusted devices.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

The ITE it51xxx I2C driver, when operating as an I2C target (slave) in buffer mode (CONFIG_I2C_TARGET + CONFIG_I2C_TARGET_BUFFER_MODE), copies host-supplied write data into the fixed-size data->target_in_buffer inside its target FIFO interrupt handler target_i2c_isr_fifo() in drivers/i2c/i2c_ite_it51xxx.c. The copy loop stores to target_in_buffer[i + data->w_index] and only checks data->w_index against sizeof(data->target_in_buffer) after the write has already completed, so the bounds check cannot prevent the overflow. The running index data->w_index accumulates count bytes on every FIFO-fill interrupt of an ongoing transaction and is reset to zero only on a STOP or timeout condition. An I2C host that streams a single write transaction longer than the buffer (default CONFIG_I2C_TARGET_IT51XXX_MAX_BUF_SIZE = 256 bytes) drives data->w_index past the end of the buffer, and each subsequent host byte is written out of bounds into the adjacent data->target_out_buffer and following static device data. The trigger is a malicious or misbehaving I2C master on the same bus (for example a compromised application processor or a rogue device on an exposed I2C bus); no software privilege on the victim is required and the handler runs in the target's kernel/firmware context. Because both the written values and the overflow length are attacker-controlled, this is an out-of-bounds write that can crash the controller or be shaped toward code execution. The fix adds a pre-write bounds check in target_i2c_fifo_read_to_buf() that aborts and resets the FIFO before any out-of-bounds store.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS