CVE-2026-14490
HighCVSS 7.5Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk40th percentile - higher than 40% of all known CVEs
Summary
The Demi plugin for WordPress up to version 0.0.7 stores the HMAC key and restore token in a publicly accessible subdirectory of uploads. An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve the key and forge a request to the demi_restore_step AJAX handler, allowing recursive deletion of arbitrary directories.
Risk Assessment
An attacker can delete entire directories on the server, leading to data loss and site downtime.
Recommendation
Update the plugin immediately and protect the uploads directory from direct access.
Other vulnerabilities in Demi
See all- CVE-2026-14333High
The Demi WordPress plugin before version 0.0.7 stores its full-site backup archives in a publicly accessible location under a predictable filename and without access protection. This allows unauthenticated attackers to download complete backups including the site database and its user password hashes.
- CVE-2026-15012Medium
The Demi plugin for WordPress up to version 0.0.8 allows unauthenticated attackers to copy arbitrary files on the server via the handle_restore_step function. Lack of access controls on the wp-content/uploads/demi-backup-state/ directory exposes the restore key used to authenticate the unauthenticated AJAX handler. The attack requires a prior restore operation to have been initiated.
Original NVD description (English source)
The Demi – One Click Demo Import, WP Backup & Site Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary Directory Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 0.0.7. The vulnerability exists because the plugin stores its HMAC signing key and per-step restore token as dotfiles inside a publicly accessible subdirectory of the WordPress uploads folder — without any `.htaccess` or index file protection — and the `demi_restore_step` AJAX handler, registered for unauthenticated callers, explicitly accepts possession of the on-disk signing key as a standalone alternative to WordPress capability and nonce checks; an unauthenticated attacker who retrieves the exposed key can forge a valid signed state envelope to invoke `CleanDir::execute()` with a caller-supplied absolute path that is subject to no allow-list or path-canonicalization check. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to recursively delete arbitrary directories on the server.