CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-14367

LowCVSS 3.1
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

A vulnerability in the I3C IBI subsystem of the Linux kernel (drivers/i3c/i3c_ibi_workq.c) stems from missing synchronization on the free-list of work nodes (sys_slist_t). Allocation and deallocation helpers are called from interrupt context (ISR) and the workqueue thread without locks, leading to a race condition. An attacker with physical access to the I3C bus can trigger a series of interrupts, causing list corruption, double allocation, or out-of-bounds writes.

Risk Assessment

The risk to the organization includes system crashes or hangs (denial of service) and potential memory corruption. Exploitation requires physical access to the I3C bus and precise timing, limiting real-world impact, but in environments with untrusted peripherals it could be used to destabilize the system.

Recommendation

Apply the vendor-provided kernel patch immediately, which introduces ibi_work_alloc()/ibi_work_free() helpers guarded by a k_spinlock. Update to a kernel version containing the fix and monitor security advisories.

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Original NVD description (English source)

The I3C IBI subsystem in drivers/i3c/i3c_ibi_workq.c hands out statically-allocated work nodes through a free-list i3c_ibi_work_nodes_free implemented as a plain sys_slist_t, which provides no synchronization. The allocation helpers (i3c_ibi_work_enqueue, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_target_irq, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_hotjoin, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_controller_request, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_cb) called sys_slist_get() directly from ISR context, while the workqueue handler i3c_ibi_work_handler() returned nodes with sys_slist_append() from the workqueue thread, with no lock on either side. Because sys_slist_get() and sys_slist_append() are neither atomic nor interrupt-safe, an IBI interrupt that fires while the workqueue thread is mid-append (or a truly parallel access under CONFIG_SMP) races on the shared list. This corrupts the list linkage: a node may be handed to two consumers, a node may be lost, or the head/tail pointers may be left inconsistent so sys_slist_get() returns a stale or garbage pointer. In the double-hand-out case the subsequent memcpy(ibi_node, ibi_work, sizeof(*ibi_node)) overwrites a node still in flight; a garbage pointer turns the same memcpy into an out-of-bounds write. The race is driven by I3C bus traffic — IBIs, hot-joins, and controller-role requests originate from target devices on the bus, and I3C supports hot-joining devices. An attacker controlling an I3C peripheral on the board's chip-to-chip bus can generate high-frequency interrupts timed to collide with the free operation. Exploitation requires physical access to the bus and winning a narrow timing window; the most realistic impact is a crash or hang (denial of service), with memory corruption possible but hard to control. The fix wraps all free-list sys_slist_get()/sys_slist_append() operations in the new ibi_work_alloc()/ibi_work_free() helpers, each guarded by a k_spinlock (ibi_work_lock), closing the race across ISR and thread contexts.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS