CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-13480

LowCVSS 3.1
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

A vulnerability in the LoRaWAN TS004 Fragmented Data Block Transport handler frag_transport_package_callback() in Zephyr RTOS (subsys/lorawan/services/frag_transport.c) lacks validation of remaining payload bytes before each access. An attacker with session keys can cause an out-of-bounds read (up to ~232 bytes) past the RxPayload buffer, copying adjacent static memory into decoder buffers and the FUOTA flash image.

Risk Assessment

The risk to the organization is a limited memory disclosure (e.g., keys, configuration data) due to an out-of-bounds read. However, this requires possession of session keys, so the real threat is mainly in scenarios where keys have been compromised.

Recommendation

Apply the vendor-provided fix immediately (adding remaining-length guards before each access). If the fix is unavailable, restrict trust in the FUOTA server and monitor session key integrity.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr RTOS

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Original NVD description (English source)

The LoRaWAN TS004 Fragmented Data Block Transport handler frag_transport_package_callback() in subsys/lorawan/services/frag_transport.c parses downlink command bytes without validating that enough payload bytes remain before each access. The loop's only bound is rx_pos < len; after consuming the one-byte command id the handler cast rx_buf + rx_pos to a 10-byte struct frag_transport_setup_req, and for a DATA_FRAGMENT command passed &rx_buf[rx_pos] to the fragment decoder, which reads exactly ctx.frag_size bytes — with no remaining-length check in either case. The fragment size is attacker-chosen in a preceding FRAG_SESSION_SETUP command (ctx.frag_size = req->frag_size, capped at CONFIG_LORAWAN_FRAG_TRANSPORT_MAX_FRAG_SIZE, default 232). rx_buf aliases the 255-byte static MacCtx.RxPayload buffer in the loramac-node MAC layer, while len is the actual decrypted payload length. By padding a downlink with mismatched-index DATA_FRAGMENT filler commands (each advancing rx_pos by three bytes without producing an answer) and appending one matching-index fragment near the end of the payload, an attacker can make the decoder read up to roughly frag_size bytes past the end of RxPayload, copying adjacent static memory into the decoder buffers and the FUOTA flash image. The handler runs only on downlinks that have already passed the LoRaWAN frame MIC and FRMPayload decryption, so the defect is reachable only by a party holding the device's session keys (the FUOTA server or an attacker who has compromised those keys). The out-of-bounds bytes are never returned to the sender — the only uplink emitted is a status answer carrying fragment counts — so there is no direct disclosure channel, and on typical flat-memory LoRaWAN MCUs the over-read stays within mapped memory, making a crash unlikely. The impact is therefore a bounded out-of-bounds read with limited confidentiality consequence and no write or control-flow primitive. The fix adds remaining-length guards before each access.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS