CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-13216

MediumCVSS 6.1
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.18%

8th percentile - higher than 8% of all known CVEs

Summary

The virtio PCI driver in Zephyr OS (drivers/virtio/virtio_pci.c) improperly validates the capability length (cap_len) read from PCI configuration space. The lack of runtime validation (assert is disabled in production builds) leads to an out-of-bounds write on the kernel stack during device initialization.

Risk Assessment

A malicious virtio PCIe device (e.g., physical or passed through to a guest) can overwrite the kernel stack, potentially causing a system crash or arbitrary code execution in kernel mode. In typical hypervisor deployments the risk is limited, but on bare-metal systems or in confidential computing scenarios it poses a serious threat.

Recommendation

Update Zephyr OS immediately to a version containing the fix that adds a runtime range check for cap_len before it is used in copy operations. Until updated, avoid using untrusted virtio PCIe devices.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr OS

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

The virtio PCI driver (drivers/virtio/virtio_pci.c) parses a device's PCI capability list during driver initialization. In virtio_pci_read_cap() the device-supplied capability length byte cap_len (read from PCI config space via pcie_conf_read()) was only checked with assert(tmp.cap_len == cap_struct_size). That assert resolves to __ASSERT_NO_MSG(), gated by CONFIG_ASSERT, which defaults off in production builds, so the value reached the copy logic completely unvalidated. The length then drives a loop that copies extra capability dwords into a fixed-size stack buffer supplied by the caller. A cap_len below the 24-byte base struct virtio_pci_cap underflows the unsigned extra_data_words count to a near-SIZE_MAX value, producing an effectively unbounded stack write; a cap_len above the caller's buffer (up to 255) writes up to roughly 228 bytes of device-controlled data past the buffer. Both are out-of-bounds writes of attacker-controlled content executed in kernel mode during boot-time device probe. The input originates from the virtio device. In the common deployment where Zephyr runs as a guest under a hypervisor, the device backend is the host, which already fully outranks the guest, so the bug yields no privilege escalation. The exploitable case is a virtio device that is untrusted relative to the Zephyr kernel — an untrusted or physical/passthrough virtio PCIe device on a bare-metal system, or a confidential-computing posture where the guest must defend against the host — where a malicious device can corrupt the kernel stack and potentially achieve code execution or a crash. The fix replaces the compiled-out assert with a runtime range check rejecting cap_len outside [sizeof(struct virtio_pci_cap), cap_struct_size] before any arithmetic or copy.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS