CVE-2026-13048
HighCVSS 8.2Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk16th percentile - higher than 16% of all known CVEs
Summary
A vulnerability in the Data::MuForm::Localizer module for Perl (up to version 0.05) allows arbitrary code execution via a crafted message catalog header. The load_lexicon function does not validate the language attribute, enabling loading of any readable .po file and executing code from the Plural-Forms header.
Risk Assessment
An attacker who can control the language attribute (e.g., from Accept-Language header) and place a .po file in an accessible location can execute code as the application user, leading to full system compromise or data theft.
Recommendation
Update Data::MuForm::Localizer to a version newer than 0.05 if available. If not possible, restrict language attribute sources to a trusted list and ensure no writable paths for .po files.
Original NVD description (English source)
Data::MuForm::Localizer versions through 0.05 for Perl execute Perl from a message catalog header, reached at an arbitrary path because load_lexicon interpolates the language attribute into the catalog filename. load_lexicon builds the catalog path by appending `Messages/$lang.po` to the directory holding Localizer.pm, where $lang is the language attribute, with no check that it names a bare locale tag. A value holding `../` segments walks out of the message directory, so any readable path with a `.po` suffix is loaded. While parsing the catalog, extract_header_msgstr takes the `Plural-Forms:` header, prefixes `$` to the bare words nplurals, plural and n, and passes the rest verbatim into a string that is evaluated: the nplurals form evaluates the header expression immediately, and the plural_code form compiles it into a subroutine whose body runs when a plural message is localized. A header of `nplurals=2; plural=(system('...'),0);` therefore runs that command as the catalog loads. The evaluation inherits strict, so an expression that assigns to an undeclared variable fails to compile, while one built from calls alone does not. An application that sets the language attribute from request data, an Accept-Language header or a locale parameter, and an attacker who can place a file with a `.po` suffix and chosen contents at a readable path, together give code execution as the application user. The message expansion path is not affected: expand_named substitutes only the placeholder names the caller supplies, and _mangle_value returns the value unchanged.

