CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-112880

LowCVSS 2.1
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

In hackney (benoitc) from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0, improper neutralization of CRLF sequences in HTTP headers (HTTP Request/Response Splitting) exists in hackney_http_connect. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it; a CR, LF, or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.

Risk Assessment

If the callback value is derived from untrusted data (e.g., proxy challenge headers), an attacker could inject additional headers into the CONNECT request, potentially leading to request splitting and bypassing security controls.

Recommendation

Upgrade hackney to version 4.9.0. Ensure the value returned by proxy_auth_fun contains no CR, LF, or NUL control bytes.

Other vulnerabilities in hackney

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Original NVD description (English source)

Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy. The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS