CVE-2026-110726

In `api-gateway` versions up to `1.7.3`, the default rate-limit key resolver, `ClientIpKeyResolver`, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the `X-Forwarded-For` request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.

In api-gateway versions till 1.7.3, the default rate-limit key resolver, ClientIpKeyResolver, derives the per-client bucket key from the leftmost element of the X-Forwarded-For request header. That element is supplied by the originating HTTP client and is not validated against any trusted-proxy list. A single attacker can therefore obtain an unlimited number of independent rate-limit buckets — one per unique header value — and completely bypass the gateway's request-rate limiting on every route that uses the shipped default configuration.

The api-gateway container running with root privileges allows an attacker to escape the container and access the host system to perform unintended actions.

An attacker who intercepts and tampers with traffic between the client application and the API Gateway server could potentially deserialize arbitrary objects. This vulnerability could lead to broken security expectations or remote code execution.