CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-109400

HighCVSS 7.5
Published: Translated: NVD NIST

Summary

The InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration plugin for WordPress (versions up to and including 0.1.4.1) is vulnerable to privilege escalation. The plugin registers its admin page using a role name returned by InstaWP_Setting::get_allowed_role() as the required capability, and generate_section_field() renders the master API key as a plain-text HTML input without additional manage_options checks. An authenticated attacker with Subscriber-level access or above can read the plaintext master API key, use its SHA-256-derived secret as a bearer token in the plugin's REST API, and call POST /wp-json/instawp-connect/v2/auto-login to mint a 30-second single-use login URL that sets an administrator authentication cookie.

Risk Assessment

A low-privileged attacker can fully take over the WordPress site, gaining administrative access and performing any actions. This requires the site to be actively connected to InstaWP and an administrator to have added the attacker's role to the Sync Tab Access list, though a mixed configuration retaining administrator alongside a lower role still exposes the API key.

Recommendation

Immediately update the InstaWP Connect plugin to a version newer than 0.1.4.1 if available, or disable it. Review and remove lower roles from the instawp_sync_tab_roles list and verify whether the API key has been exposed.

Related vulnerabilities

Original NVD description (English source)

The InstaWP Connect – 1-click WP Staging & Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 0.1.4.1 This is due to the plugin registering its admin page via `add_management_page()` using a role name returned by `InstaWP_Setting::get_allowed_role()` as the required capability — which WordPress resolves as a real capability match for any user holding that role — combined with `generate_section_field()` rendering the master API key from the `instawp_api_options` option directly as the `value` attribute of a plain-text HTML input with no additional `manage_options` or equivalent capability check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above to read the plaintext master API key, use its SHA-256-derived secret as a bearer token accepted by the plugin's REST API `validate_api_request()`, and call `POST /wp-json/instawp-connect/v2/auto-login` to mint a 30-second single-use login URL that sets an administrator authentication cookie — fully escalating their privileges. Exploitation requires the site to be actively connected to InstaWP and an administrator to have added the attacker's role to the plugin's Sync Tab Access list (`instawp_sync_tab_roles`); notably, the settings tab suppression logic only hides the tab when `administrator` is absent from the list entirely, meaning a mixed configuration retaining administrator alongside a lower role still serves the full settings page — including the API key — to the lower-privileged user.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS