CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-10773

MediumCVSS 5.4
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.18%

8th percentile - higher than 8% of all known CVEs

Summary

The net_dhcpv4_msg_type_name() function in Zephyr DHCPv4 indexes a static name table after a faulty bounds check. Using sizeof instead of ARRAY_SIZE allows out-of-bounds read for message-type values from 9 up to 32 (or 64). The msg_type value originates from an unchecked raw byte from a received DHCP packet.

Risk Assessment

When the DHCPv4 module is built at DEBUG level (CONFIG_NET_DHCPV4_LOG_LEVEL_DBG), an attacker can cause a DHCP client crash (denial of service) and potentially disclose adjacent pointer contents through the log.

Recommendation

Update Zephyr to a version containing the fix (sizeof replaced with ARRAY_SIZE) or ensure CONFIG_NET_DHCPV4_LOG_LEVEL_DBG is not enabled in production environments.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

The DHCPv4 client helper net_dhcpv4_msg_type_name() in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c indexes a static 8-element const char * name table after a faulty bounds check. The guard used msg_type <= sizeof(name) instead of msg_type <= ARRAY_SIZE(name); sizeof returns the byte size of the pointer array (32 on 32-bit, 64 on 64-bit targets) rather than the element count of 8, so message-type values from 9 up to that byte size pass the check and cause name[msg_type - 1] to read past the end of the array. The msg_type value originates from the DHCP MESSAGE TYPE option, which is read as an unchecked raw byte from a received packet (net_pkt_read_u8) and passed unmodified into the lookup. A DHCP server, or any host able to inject a spoofed DHCP reply onto the client's link, can therefore drive the index out of bounds. The out-of-range slot yields a garbage const char * that is then dereferenced by a %s log conversion. The lookup is reached only from a debug log statement (NET_DBG / LOG_DBG), so the out-of-bounds read is triggerable only when the DHCPv4 log module is built at DEBUG level (CONFIG_NET_DHCPV4_LOG_LEVEL_DBG), which is not the default configuration. When that condition holds, the result is an out-of-bounds read and a wild-pointer dereference: most likely a crash of the DHCP client (denial of service) and potentially disclosure of an adjacent pointer's contents through the log output. The fix replaces sizeof with ARRAY_SIZE, restoring the correct 1..8 acceptance window.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS