CVE Catalog

CVE-2026-10680

HighCVSS 7.6
Published: Updated: Translated: NVD NIST

Exploitation Probability (EPSS)

Low risk
0.11%

2th percentile - higher than 2% of all known CVEs

Summary

A vulnerability in the Bluetooth BR/EDR (Classic) stack of Zephyr RTOS affects L2CAP configuration handlers (l2cap_br_conf_req and l2cap_br_conf_rsp). The minimum command size validation used buf->len (bytes remaining in the whole PDU) instead of len (per-command data length from the L2CAP header). An attacker can send a CONF_REQ command with a header smaller than the configuration-request structure (e.g., 0) followed by another command, causing buf->len to still pass the check. This leads to an underflow of opt_len to near 0xFFFF, resulting in an out-of-bounds read and potential out-of-bounds write when option bytes encode MTU or flush-timeout.

Risk Assessment

An unauthenticated attacker within Bluetooth radio range can establish an ACL connection and trigger memory corruption and denial of service (host/device crash). The flaw can be exploited before pairing/encryption, increasing the attack surface for devices with Bluetooth Classic enabled.

Recommendation

Immediately update Zephyr RTOS to a version containing the fix (v4.4.0 or later with the patch). If updating is not possible, consider disabling Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) or limiting radio range.

Other vulnerabilities in Zephyr RTOS

See all
Original NVD description (English source)

The Classic (BR/EDR) L2CAP signaling handlers l2cap_br_conf_req() and l2cap_br_conf_rsp() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c validated the minimum command size against buf->len (the bytes remaining in the whole received PDU) instead of len (the per-command data length from the L2CAP signaling header). Because multiple signaling commands can be packed into one PDU, buf->len may exceed a command's len. An attacker can send a CONF_REQ command with a header length smaller than the configuration-request structure (e.g. 0), followed by another command so that buf->len still satisfies the check. The check then passes incorrectly and opt_len = len - sizeof(*req) underflows the uint16_t to a near-0xFFFF value. The configuration-option loop, which lacks an opt_len-versus-buf->len guard, then walks far past the end of the pooled ACL receive buffer using net_buf pull primitives that perform no runtime bounds check, producing an out-of-bounds read of host memory and, when the out-of-bounds option bytes encode an MTU or flush-timeout option, an out-of-bounds write. The BR/EDR signaling channel is processed before pairing/encryption and an L2CAP channel to an L0 service such as SDP can be opened without pairing, so an unauthenticated peer within radio range that can establish an ACL connection can trigger the flaw, leading to memory corruption and denial of service (host/device crash). The defect is present in released versions including v4.4.0. The fix validates against len instead of buf->len in both handlers.

Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS