CVE-2026-105298
MediumCVSS 6.3Summary
Before version 0.9.0, Pingora accepted HTTP/2 requests where the Host header differed from the :authority pseudo-header. Request filters, cache keys, and logs saw the :authority value, but the upstream received the client-supplied Host value. Pingora also accepted :authority values containing userinfo (e.g., [email protected]), violating RFC 9113 Section 8.3.1.
Risk Assessment
A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a single HTTP/2 request that the application sees as one host and the upstream receives as another, potentially leading to cache poisoning or host-based access control bypass. Deployments that accept HTTP/2 from clients and use the request authority for security or caching decisions are affected.
Recommendation
Upgrade to Pingora 0.9.0 or later, which rejects HTTP/2 requests with mismatched Host/:authority, multiple Host headers, or userinfo in authority. If upgrading is not possible, in request_filter reject HTTP/2 requests with a Host header different from the URI authority or with '@' in the authority.
Other vulnerabilities in Pingora
See all- CVE-2026-105299High
Before version 0.9.0, the HTTP/1 upstream path in pingora-proxy did not remove the Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or headers nominated by Connection, despite RFC 9110 requirements. A client could nominate a header added by the application in upstream_request_filter (e.g., X-Forwarded-For), which would then be stripped by an HTTP/1 intermediary before reaching the origin.
- CVE-2026-105297High
Before version 0.8.1, Pingora's HTTP/2 server used the h2 crate's default limits, allowing a remote, unauthenticated client to send 1-byte HPACK references to a near-empty header. This caused the server to allocate hundreds of thousands of header fields per stream across an unlimited number of streams on one connection, potentially exhausting memory and terminating the Pingora process.
Original NVD description (English source)
Summary Before version 0.9.0, Pingora accepted HTTP/2 requests whose Host header differed from the :authority pseudo-header. Request filters, cache keys, and logs that read the request URI (session.req_header().uri) saw the :authority value, but the upstream received the client-supplied Host value. Pingora also accepted :authority values containing userinfo (for example, [email protected]). This violates RFC 9113 Section 8.3.1, which requires an intermediary to use the :authority value for Host and replace any existing Host field. Root cause * HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1: Host was generated from :authority only when the request had no Host header, so a conflicting client Host was forwarded unchanged. * HTTP/2 to HTTP/2: the client Host header was removed and used to overwrite the upstream :authority, after request filters had already run against the original :authority. * The HTTP/2 server did not compare Host with :authority and did not reject userinfo in the authority. Impact A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a single HTTP/2 request that the application sees as one host and the upstream receives as another. Where request filters, access controls, or cache keys use the URI authority and the upstream routes by Host, this can lead to: * Cache poisoning: a response from another virtual host is stored under the victim host's cache key and served to other users (this also requires the upstream to serve different content per Host). * Host-based access control bypass: a request approved for one host is served by a different virtual host on the upstream. Deployments that do not accept HTTP/2 from clients, or that do not use the request authority for security or caching decisions, are not affected. Note that Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as internal Pingora services at Cloudflare do not have HTTP/2 clients. Mitigation: * Upgrade to pingora 0.9.0 or later. Pingora now returns 400 Bad Request for HTTP/2 requests whose Host differs from :authority, that contain more than one Host, or whose authority contains userinfo, and keeps the upstream Host or :authority consistent with the request authority. Fix commits: https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/915590a91811877795531f6ba0927a3138b5cb4b , https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/ffab8302d08d4292d1924eb8fe84647fd5cb8e76 * If you cannot upgrade: in request_filter, reject HTTP/2 requests that carry a Host header different from the URI authority, or whose authority contains '@'.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS