CVE-2026-104429

Zebra before 4.4.0 contains a consensus divergence vulnerability in V5 transparent signature verification, computing a ZIP-244 digest for SIGHASH_SINGLE inputs lacking corresponding outputs instead of failing. Attackers can craft V5 transactions with fewer outputs than inputs that Zebra accepts and templates via getblocktemplate, producing blocks zcashd rejects.

Zebra before 4.5.0 contains an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability that allows remote P2P peers to exhaust blocking-pool threads by sending oversized block locator vectors. Attackers can send getblocks or getheaders messages with up to 65,535 locator hashes, triggering per-hash chain lookups that degrade block validation, RPC, and mempool performance.

Zebra zebrad 4.4.0 and zebra-script 6.0.0 fail to enforce a ZIP-244 consensus rule, accepting V5 transparent inputs signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE that lack a corresponding output. Attackers can broadcast crafted V5 transactions with more inputs than outputs that Zebra accepts but zcashd rejects, causing a network consensus split.

ZcashFoundation Zebra zebra-rpc before 8.0.0 and zebrad before 4.5.0 contain a reachable assertion in the z_listunifiedreceivers RPC handler, which calls expect() on Sapling receiver parsing that fails for Unified Addresses carrying invalid Jubjub points. Authenticated RPC clients can submit such an address to abort the zebrad process, repeatably keeping the node offline.

Zebra before 6.3.0 contains an improper exceptional condition check in ChainSync::obtain_tips that discards valid one-hash FindBlocks responses, falsely reporting close-to-tip status. Peers returning only the next block hash cause a zero-length sync sample, making the /ready endpoint return 200 OK while the node remains behind the tip.

Zebra before 6.0.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows unauthenticated peers to stall Tokio workers by submitting mempool transactions requiring expensive synchronous script verification. Attackers can send non-standard high-sigop P2SH transactions that reach CachedFfiTransaction::is_valid() before standardness checks, saturating the verifier buffer and rendering the node unresponsive.

Zebra zebrad 4.5.0 and zebra-script 7.0.0 count P2SH redeem script signature operations in legacy mode rather than zcashd's accurate P2SH mode, overcounting CHECKMULTISIG preceded by OP_1 through OP_16 as 20 sigops and causing a consensus divergence. Remote attackers can broadcast P2SH spends using low-threshold multisig redeem scripts so that a block zcashd accepts exceeds Zebra's inflated MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS count, causing Zebra nodes to reject it and stall off the chain.

Zebra before 6.1.0 contains an incomplete cleanup vulnerability in the state write task that allows remote unauthenticated peers to stall node synchronization by poisoning parent_error_map. Attackers can deliver a coinbase-malleated block sharing a canonical block's hash before it propagates, causing the next canonical block to be rejected and stalling the node for roughly 2,000 blocks.

Zebra before 6.1.0 contains an inefficient algorithmic complexity vulnerability in remaining_transaction_value that clones the entire block-level spent-UTXO map per transaction during contextual verification. Attackers can mine or seed the mempool with roughly 26,000 minimal single-input transactions in one block, stalling every validating node for over 52 seconds.

ZcashFoundation Zebra before 6.1.0 contains a resource exhaustion vulnerability that allows unauthenticated peers to degrade block processing by pushing transactions with invalid Orchard proofs without being misbehavior-scored. Attackers can repeatedly push invalid proofs into the shared halo2 batch verifier, forcing honest block proofs onto the slow individual-verification path and slowing block processing roughly sevenfold.