CVE-2026-100717

Froxlor 2.0.0 through 2.3.10 is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting. When a customer (the lowest-privileged authenticated role) uploads an SSL certificate for one of their own domains, the Certificates API add()/update() methods parse it with openssl_x509_parse() and store the issuer organization (issuer['O']) value verbatim without sanitization. Froxlor's table-listing renderer then emits scalar cells through Twig's `raw` filter, disabling HTML auto-escaping, so when an administrator or reseller opens Domains > SSL certificates the attacker-supplied issuer value executes as script in the privileged user's session. This crosses a privilege boundary from customer to admin and can result in full administrator account takeover; because a Froxlor admin controls webserver, DNS, and PHP configuration applied by a cron job running as root, the issue can be further escalated to command execution as root on the managed server. The issue is fixed in Froxlor 2.3.12.

Credential disclosure vulnerability in Froxlor before version 2.3.12 in the DirProtections.listing API command that returns htpasswd password hashes. Authenticated API users can retrieve bcrypt password hashes for protected-directory users, enabling offline cracking attempts and exposure of reused credentials.

Froxlor through 2.3.10 does not enforce the mail.allow_external_domains policy in the EmailSender.add API command. When an administrator has enabled the allowed-sender feature but disabled external allowed-sender domains (mail.enable_allow_sender = 1, mail.allow_external_domains = 0), an authenticated customer with API access can still use EmailSender.add to register an arbitrary external sender address for their mailbox, which is stored despite the policy. This creates a bypass between the UI/administrator configuration and the API, and — where the generated mail configuration consumes the allowed-sender table — allows a customer to authorize sender identities outside their hosted domains, facilitating sender spoofing. Fixed in 2.3.12.

Froxlor through 2.3.10 disables a user's two-factor authentication immediately upon an unauthenticated-triggerable GET request to the 2FA management page (e.g. /customer_index.php?page=2fa&action=delete), with no confirmation, re-authentication, or CSRF token. The global CSRF middleware only covers POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE requests, and the session cookie is set to SameSite=Lax, so a cross-site top-level navigation (link click or redirect) carries the victim's session and silently clears type_2fa/data_2fa. Both the customer and admin 2FA handlers are affected. An attacker who lures a logged-in panel user into following a crafted link reduces that account to password-only authentication, which can be chained with a compromised password for account takeover. Fixed in 2.3.12.

froxlor versions before 2.3.12 fail to invalidate existing panel sessions, API keys, and 2FA trust cookies when a user password is changed. Attackers holding hijacked sessions, valid API keys, or 2FA trust tokens retain full account access after password rotation, bypassing incident response actions.

Froxlor through 2.3.10 does not filter sensitive columns from API responses: Domains::get(), Domains::listing(), SubDomains::get(), and the admin branch of SubDomains::listing() perform a wildcard SELECT over the panel_domains table and return the row unmodified, including the panel_domains.dkim_privkey field. An authenticated, non-superadmin admin holding the delegated customers_see_all flag can therefore read the DKIM private signing keys of domains belonging to other tenants via Domains.get, Domains.listing, SubDomains.get, or SubDomains.listing, with a single listing call disclosing the key of every visible domain. The disclosed keys allow an attacker to sign email that passes DKIM verification and DMARC alignment for the affected domains. This is a follow-on to an incomplete fix that stripped password and data_2fa but not dkim_privkey. The issue is fixed in 2.3.12.

Froxlor through 2.3.10 stores only a numeric user ID in remembered-2FA tokens (panel_2fa_tokens) without recording the account namespace, and the remembered-token lookup during login is not constrained to the customer or administrator account type. Because customer and administrator IDs are allocated from separate namespaces, a remembered-2FA token legitimately issued to a customer with a given ID also matches an administrator with the same ID. An attacker who controls a customer account with a colliding ID, holds a valid remembered-2FA cookie for it, and already knows the target administrator's password can bypass the administrator's TOTP second factor and obtain an authenticated administrator session. This is a second-factor bypass only; it does not defeat password authentication. Fixed in 2.3.12.

Froxlor before 2.3.13 returns the ssl_key_file column — which stores the raw PEM TLS private-key content — verbatim in the JSON responses of the Certificates.get and Certificates.listing API commands, because the results of the underlying domain_ssl_settings queries are passed through ApiCommand::response() without any field stripping or allowlist. A low-privileged authenticated customer API caller can retrieve the private keys of their own domains' certificates, including Let's Encrypt keys that Froxlor generates server-side and stores root-only (0600) and to which the customer otherwise has no filesystem access; reseller and customers_see_all admin accounts can dump the private keys of other principals through the same sink. Disclosed keys enable domain impersonation, passive decryption of captured TLS traffic, and active machine-in-the-middle attacks.

Froxlor in versions 2.3.10 and earlier contains an incomplete fix for GHSA-75h4-... — the customer data-export (DataDump) cron fails to validate intermediate path components of the export destination. Froxlor\FileDir::makeCorrectDir() contains an off-by-one in its path-component walk that skips the first segment below the customer home directory, and the guard in ExportCron.php checks only the final component with is_link(). An authenticated customer with the export feature enabled can schedule an export into a genuine subdirectory of their own webspace, then replace an intermediate path component with a symlink before the root-owned cron runs. The cron's 'chown -R' then recursively changes ownership of the linked directory tree (e.g. /etc) to the customer's UID, yielding host root and cross-tenant compromise.

Froxlor through 2.3.10 is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion via symlink following in the FTP data deletion cron task. Cron task 8 (deleteFtpData), queued when an FTP account is deleted, calls FileDir::makeCorrectDir() without the $fixed_homedir argument, so the symlink component walk is skipped, and then executes 'rm -rf' as root on the resulting path with string-level guards only. Because makeCorrectDir() appends a trailing slash, GNU rm dereferences a symlink used either as an intermediate or final path component. An authenticated customer who can write to the FTP home directory can plant a symlink between task insertion and cron execution, causing the root cron job to recursively delete arbitrary directory trees.