CVE-2025-48042

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject a filter expression through a forged keyset pagination cursor, resulting in SQL injection or code execution depending on the data layer. Read actions with keyset pagination decode the client-supplied page[:after] or page[:before] cursor in decode_values/2 in lib/ash/page/keyset.ex using non_executable_binary_to_term/2 with [:safe]. That guard blocks new atoms, funs, and ports, but not a struct built from atoms already interned in a running Ash application, so a decoded %Ash.Query.Call{} expression survives and is spliced into the keyset filter as a comparison value in do_filters/4 and evaluated. Because the cursor bypasses the Ash.Expr macro, the runtime never applies the private?/public? gate that would otherwise reject it. On AshPostgres the injected fragment is inlined into the SQL query; on the ETS and Simple data layers it is evaluated in-process as an arbitrary function call. This issue affects ash: from 1.17.0 before 3.31.3.

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to forge a relationship to a record they cannot name, and to recover the secret value used to look it up. When manage_relationship is used with on_lookup: :relate on a belongs_to relationship, the client-supplied lookup value is passed to Ash.Query.filter/2 without being cast to the attribute type. A nested map submitted where a scalar is expected is therefore interpreted as a filter predicate rather than a literal, so a lookup for a specific record becomes a query for any record matching a condition. The same path omits Ash.Query.limit(1), leaving Ash.read_one/2 able to distinguish no match from one match from several, which turns comparison predicates into an oracle for the lookup value. Authorization is unaffected; the destination read policy still applies.

Uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to exhaust node memory via a crafted keyset pagination cursor. Read actions with keyset pagination deserialize client-supplied page[:after] or page[:before] cursor in decode_values/2 in lib/ash/page/keyset.ex, which base64-decodes the value and passes it to :erlang.binary_to_term/2 without bounding its size. The Erlang external term format supports zlib-compressed payloads, which the decoder inflates transparently, so a cursor of a few kilobytes can allocate tens of megabytes of heap in a single call. Ash itself only ever encodes cursors uncompressed, so the decoder accepts a term shape its encoder never produces. Concurrent requests aggregate these allocations and can terminate the node.

A vulnerability in the Ash library allows an attacker to set the value of a private action argument intended to be controlled only by trusted server-side code. The filtering of private arguments is incomplete both in the regular changeset path (for binary keys) and in the atomic path (no filtering at all).

In the ash project, there is an incorrect authorization vulnerability that allows authentication bypass. The issue affects files lib/ash/policy/policy.ex and the function 'Elixir.Ash.Policy.Policy':expression/2 in versions from 3.6.3 up to 3.7.0.

The Ash library versions 0.1.0 through 3.6.2 have an authorization vulnerability that allows authentication bypass. The issue is in the file lib/ash/policy/authorizer/authorizer.ex and the strict_filters/2 function.