CVE-2025-39682
CriticalCVSS 9.8Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk38th percentile - higher than 38% of all known CVEs
Summary
In the Linux kernel TLS, handling of zero-length records on the rx_list is flawed. When the initial record comes from rx_list and is zero-length, it can break processing logic as zero-length records should not be zero-copied.
Risk Assessment
This could lead to errors in TLS data processing, potentially causing data loss or incorrect behavior in TLS-using applications.
Recommendation
Apply the Linux kernel patch that correctly handles zero-length records on the rx_list to prevent incorrect processing.
Original NVD description (English source)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.