CVE-2025-34500
HighCVSS 7.0Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk4th percentile - higher than 4% of all known CVEs
Summary
Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. An attacker with access to the update interface (typically via the USB update port) can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, persistently compromising the device's integrity and deck randomization process.
Risk Assessment
Physical or local access to the USB update port allows persistent infection of the device with malicious firmware running as root. If misconfigured, remote exploitation over the network is also theoretically possible.
Recommendation
Apply the vendor-issued firmware updates that fix the update-chain weaknesses and disable USB update access on affected units.
Other vulnerabilities in Deck Mate 2
See all- CVE-2025-34503High
Deck Mate 1 executes firmware directly from an external EEPROM without verifying authenticity or integrity. An attacker with physical access can replace or reflash the EEPROM to run arbitrary code that persists across reboots.
- CVE-2025-34502High
Deck Mate 2 lacks a verified secure-boot chain and runtime integrity validation for its controller and display modules. Without cryptographic boot verification, an attacker with physical access can modify or replace the bootloader, kernel, or filesystem and gain persistent code execution on reboot. This weakness allows long-term firmware tampering that survives power cycles. The vendor indicates that more recent firmware updates strengthen update-chain integrity and disable physical update ports to mitigate related attack avenues.
Original NVD description (English source)
Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.
Vulnerability data from NVD (NIST) · CISA KEV · EPSS