CVE-2023-41037
MediumCVSS 4.3Exploitation Probability (EPSS)
Low risk22th percentile - higher than 22% of all known CVEs
Summary
OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. In versions up to 5.9.0, during the verification of Cleartext Signed Messages, any data preceding the 'Hash: ...' header was ignored, allowing attackers to add arbitrary text that could be perceived as signed.
Risk Assessment
Organizations may be exposed to fraud when users or applications rely on visually trusting the message contents, potentially leading to unauthorized access or data manipulation.
Recommendation
It is recommended to upgrade to version 5.10.1 or 4.10.11 to mitigate this issue. Users unable to upgrade should check the contents of `verificationResult.data` to verify what was actually signed.
Original NVD description (English source)
OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. In affected versions OpenPGP Cleartext Signed Messages are cryptographically signed messages where the signed text is readable without special tools. These messages typically contain a "Hash: ..." header declaring the hash algorithm used to compute the signature digest. OpenPGP.js up to v5.9.0 ignored any data preceding the "Hash: ..." texts when verifying the signature. As a result, malicious parties could add arbitrary text to a third-party Cleartext Signed Message, to lead the victim to believe that the arbitrary text was signed. A user or application is vulnerable to said attack vector if it verifies the CleartextMessage by only checking the returned `verified` property, discarding the associated `data` information, and instead _visually trusting_ the contents of the original message. Since `verificationResult.data` would always contain the actual signed data, users and apps that check this information are not vulnerable. Similarly, given a CleartextMessage object, retrieving the data using `getText()` or the `text` field returns only the contents that are considered when verifying the signature. Finally, re-armoring a CleartextMessage object (using `armor()` will also result in a "sanitised" version, with the extraneous text being removed. This issue has been addressed in version 5.10.1 (current stable version) which will reject messages when calling `openpgp.readCleartextMessage()` and in version 4.10.11 (legacy version) which will will reject messages when calling `openpgp.cleartext.readArmored()`. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should check the contents of `verificationResult.data` to see what data was actually signed, rather than visually trusting the contents of the armored message.

