CVE-2020-9547

A flaw in jackson-databind before 2.9.10.7 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing. The highest threat is to data confidentiality, integrity, and system availability.

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind before 2.9.10. It is related to net.sf.ehcache.hibernate.EhcacheJtaTransactionManagerLookup.

A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.0.0 through 2.9.10. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has the p6spy (3.8.6) jar in the classpath, an attacker can find an RMI service endpoint to access and make the service execute a malicious payload. This issue exists because of com.p6spy.engine.spy.P6DataSource mishandling.

A vulnerability in jackson-databind allows XML datatype deserializers (Duration, XMLGregorianCalendar) to pass raw JSON strings directly to BigInteger/BigDecimal constructors, which are quadratic in digit count. Because the digits are inside a string token rather than a number token, the StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength guard does not apply, enabling an attacker to cause excessive CPU consumption with a single request.

The DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator in jackson-databind, applied automatically when @JsonTypeInfo is used without a custom validator, omitted java.lang.Comparable from its list of unsafe base types. As a result, an application declaring an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated property or class with Comparable as its base type accepts type identifiers for essentially any class implementing Comparable, giving an attacker-controlled object instantiation primitive. A demonstrated case constructs a java.io.File for an arbitrary attacker-chosen path.

jackson-databind's deserializer for java.nio.file.Path resolves an attacker-supplied URI without restricting the URI scheme. This can allow selecting and driving an arbitrary registered FileSystemProvider during deserialization of untrusted JSON. Impact is limited if only JDK built-in providers are present, but can be more severe with third-party providers on the classpath.

jackson-databind, the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor, prior to versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1, has a vulnerability in the java.net.InetAddress branch of FromStringDeserializer.Std._deserialize(). It calls InetAddress.getByName() on attacker-controlled input, causing eager DNS resolution during deserialization and enabling DNS-based server-side request forgery and internal-host enumeration.

In jackson-databind, the UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrapped() method replays buffered JSON for a @JsonUnwrapped property without a prop.visibleInView() guard, allowing a property annotated with both @JsonView and @JsonUnwrapped to be written from attacker JSON under a less-privileged active view.

A vulnerability in jackson-databind allows bypassing @JsonIgnore in Java Records using PropertyNamingStrategy. Affected versions from 2.15.0 to 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4 register the ignored field under its original name before applying the naming strategy, enabling the renamed JSON key to be assigned to the Record constructor parameter.

In jackson-databind from version 2.8.0 to 2.18.9, 2.21.5, and 3.1.4, a vulnerability exists where per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties exclusions are applied by removing ignored properties from BeanPropertyMap, but subsequent case-insensitivity processing (ACCEPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_PROPERTIES) rebuilds the map from the original unfiltered source, restoring the removed properties. The ignored property becomes writable again.