CVE Vulnerability Catalog

Marmite through 0.4.2 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the development server started by --serve that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files. The handle_request function in src/server.rs fails to reject .. segments after percent-decoding and joining the request path to the output folder, enabling attackers to request encoded traversal sequences to access files readable by the marmite process.

PX4 Autopilot through 1.17.0 contains an uncontrolled stack allocation vulnerability in the file2 test command that fails to validate the write chunk size parameter. Attackers with shell access can supply an excessively large value to the -c option to trigger stack overflow and crash the flight controller.

PX4 Autopilot through 1.17.0 contains a NULL pointer dereference vulnerability in the sd_stress command where the -b byte count parameter is parsed without validation before being passed to malloc() and memset(). Attackers with shell access, including through MAVLink, can supply invalid byte count values to crash the flight controller.

OpenClaw before 2026.9.4 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability in the mcp.app.view method that allows read-scoped operators to execute MCP App tools requiring operator.write scope. Attackers with operator.read tokens can obtain a standalone ticket from mcp.app.view and redeem it at the MCP app view endpoint to invoke state-changing tools without proper authorization checks.

OpenClaw before 2026.9.5 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability in the Gateway's local media root allowlist that breaks filesystem isolation between sandboxed sessions. Sandboxed sessions or untrusted content can cause the Gateway to read files from sibling session sandboxes or shared workspace directories through media pipeline functions that fail to restrict reads to the active session.

The NetX Duo MQTT client leaks the packet carrying a malformed PUBLISH message. Each malformed PUBLISH costs one packet, or one chain of packets, from the network driver's receive pool, and nothing returns it. A peer that can deliver a few dozen such messages exhausts the pool and stops all inbound network traffic on the device until it is rebooted.

NetX Duo's WebSocket client resets the unmasking cursor to the first NX_PACKET each time it advances through a chained packet, while the loop's upper bound belongs to the current packet. With the standard contiguous packet-pool layout, a masked server frame split across two packets drives the XOR loop through the first packet's unused payload area and on through the second packet's NX_PACKET control block. The four-byte WebSocket masking key controls the bytes written, so the corruption is attacker-chosen rather than incidental.

When NetX Secure is built with `NX_SECURE_KEY_CLEAR`, every TLS record sent on an active session is wiped after it has been handed to TCP. By then the TCP layer owns the packet chain and may already have released it to the packet pool. The wipe therefore writes zeros into packets that are free or in use by another thread, and when a reused packet's pointers no longer describe the old data, the length of the wipe underflows and it runs past the end of the packet pool.

NetX Secure TLS accepts an empty application-data record without verifying its message authentication code. In `_nx_secure_verify_mac`, a decrypted application record whose length equals the negotiated MAC size is treated as valid and returns success after advancing the receive sequence number. The received MAC is never generated or compared. Empty TLS application-data records are legal, and are commonly emitted by TLS 1.0 implementations as a BEAST mitigation.

In the `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function in NetX Secure, there is an out-of-bounds read. The function reads the ASN.1 tag byte before checking that the buffer holds at least one byte, causing a one-byte over-read when the remaining length is zero. This affects parsing of X.509 certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake.

An unprivileged, memory-protected ThreadX module can have the kernel read and write memory at addresses of its choosing, in privileged mode, and can use that to clear the MPU enable bit and remove its own isolation boundary. The Module Manager decided whether a privileged service could dereference an object address a module named by asking only whether that address fell outside the module. The manager's object pool is outside every module, so the test was satisfied by an address shifted into the interior of one of the module's own privileged allocations, which denotes no object at all. The bytes such an address presents as a control block are bytes the module put there through ordinary create and set services, so the control block ID at the front of them could be made to read as any type the module chose, and the `_txe_` layer's ID test then agreed. The reported chain uses that to reach a privileged `memset` across an attacker-chosen range.

Mounting an attacker-controlled NAND flash image (`lx_nand_flash_open()`) triggers an unbounded out-of-bounds heap **write** in LevelX's NAND flash-translation-layer metadata parser that overwrites a driver function pointer in the control block, giving a demonstrated control-flow hijack — RIP set to a full 8-byte attacker-chosen value (register-verified). Two accompanying OOB reads. All reproduced verbatim under ASan at HEAD `9f1cfdc`. (The affected metadata-parser header states "Some portions generated by Copilot (Sonnet 4.6)" — an AI-generated parser with an unchecked on-flash count.)

`gx_binres_theme_load()` sizes its theme buffer for the theme it was asked for, and allocates it even when the resource holds no theme with that id. A theme id at or past the theme count declared by the resource gets a buffer of zero bytes. The load pass then walks past the end of the theme table, takes whatever follows as a theme header, and writes a `GX_THEME` and its tables into that zero-byte buffer.

Two client-side TLS/DTLS handshake parsers in NetX Secure read fields from a server-supplied message before validating that the message is long enough to contain them. Both are bounded out-of-bounds reads on a remotely reachable path, both are reached from a TLS or DTLS client connecting to a malicious or malformed server, and both have the same shape: the bounds check exists and returns the correct status, but it runs after the read it is meant to guard.

FTP Passive Data Connection Not Bound to the Authenticated Control Peer. This means the passive data connection may be established with a different host than the one that authenticated, potentially leading to unauthorized data access.

Unbounded PPP IPCP Option Parsing Causes a Worker Stall and Out-of-bounds Read. This vulnerability can lead to service crash or information leakage.

Out-of-bounds Read from Unvalidated MSRP Attribute List Length. This vulnerability can lead to crash or information leakage.

NULL Pointer Dereference When Evicting the Sole MSRP Attribute. This vulnerability can lead to system crash.

A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability occurs when the MSRP attribute table is exhausted. Table exhaustion leads to dereferencing a NULL pointer, which can crash the application.

In the IPv4 PASV path, the FTP client accepts whatever address was sent in the server's `227` reply. Validation only covers parsing and non-zero values, so a malicious server can name any address and direct the client there.