ZenHive mpp vulnerabilities
4 known CVE vulnerabilities in ZenHive mpp, translated and rated.
- CVE-2026-73829Medium
Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses. The type="hash" credential path in MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2 guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: check_hash_unused/2 reads the dedup store, an eth_getTransactionReceipt round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does mark_hash_used/2 write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store's atomic check_and_mark/2 primitive is available and used by the type="transaction" path, but the hash path calls plain get and put even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default nil store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1.
- CVE-2026-73541High
ZenHive mpp is affected by a vulnerability of allocation of resources without limits or throttling, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty. The fee policy enforces limits only per transaction, not across concurrent requests.
- CVE-2026-73136High
ZenHive mpp is affected by an authentication bypass by capture-replay vulnerability, allowing an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer. When a static 'memo' is configured, the binding check is skipped, and an attacker can use a public transfer as a credential.
- CVE-2026-67581High
A vulnerability in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to obtain paid resources by resubmitting one settled on-chain transfer. The EVM verification mechanism does not bind the proof to the challenge or prior use, and deduplication keys are regenerated on every 402 response. On a static-price route, a single historical transfer satisfies an unbounded number of later charges.

