VINCE vulnerabilities

The type=track branch authorizes only on _is_my_case(t_attach.case) and never checks VinceTrackAttachment.shared. A coordinator-uploaded case artefact that has NOT been marked shared is still retrievable by any case member who has (or is sent) its uuid — leaking not-yet-released coordinator material to vendors on the case.

In vinny/views.py, the ModifyEmailNotifications function has an IDOR vulnerability: it fetches VinceCommEmail by raw pk from URL and toggles email_function/name without checking if the record's contact belongs to the requesting group-admin. This lets a vendor admin flip notification routing (or read email/name) for another vendor's contact.

Any authenticated case participant can fetch any OTHER vendor's CaseStatement + per-vul CaseMemberStatus by supplying that member's id — test_func only checks _is_my_case, not ownership of kwargs['member']. Bypasses share_status; leaks embargoed vendor affected/not-affected + statement text cross-tenant.