UltraVNC vulnerabilities

In UltraVNC viewer up to version 1.8.2.2, an integer overflow leads to a heap buffer overflow in the RFB protocol failure-response parsing path. The 4-byte reasonLen field (CARD32) is passed as reasonLen+1 to CheckBufferSize(), and when set to 0xFFFFFFFF it overflows to 0, causing allocation of only 256 bytes. The subsequent ReadString() then reads the original 4 GiB into that small buffer, causing overflow.

UltraVNC viewer up to version 1.8.2.2 contains an off-by-one stack buffer overflow in the RFB ServerInit message handler. When the server supplies a desktop name of exactly 2024 bytes, the ReadString function writes a null terminator beyond the allocated buffer, potentially corrupting stack data.

UltraVNC up to version 1.8.2.2 uses weak cryptography in the MS-Logon II authentication scheme. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange relies on 64-bit parameters that can be broken in under a second, and the random number generator based on rand() with a time seed allows private key recovery within a minute.

UltraVNC repeater up to version 1.8.2.2 contains an integer overflow in the win_log() function during memory allocation for list nodes. An attacker can send a sufficiently long HTTP URI, causing a heap buffer overflow that allows a partial out-of-bounds write.

A vulnerability in UltraVNC up to version 1.8.2.2 causes an out-of-bounds read in the wide-string to multibyte conversion helper. The vncWc2Mb() function calls wcslen() on a caller-supplied buffer without prior bounds checking, potentially reading past the allocated memory.

UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator to produce VNC authentication challenge bytes. The vncRandomBytes() function seeds libc rand() with time(0) + getpid() + rand(), resulting in a seed space of approximately 31 bits, entirely determined by publicly observable values. An attacker can predict the challenge within seconds, enabling forgery or offline brute-forcing of responses.