Steeltoe vulnerabilities

Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate deployments using AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() trust the public certificate supplied in the X-Client-Cert request header without proving possession of the corresponding private key. Common Cloud Foundry routers do not remove this header from inbound requests. When inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP, an attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space and can reach the application can spoof X-Client-Cert to bypass the SameOrg and SameSpace policies for the certificate validity period. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0.

Steeltoe in versions from 4.0.0 until 4.3.0, in ConsulDiscoveryClient, constructs ConsulServiceInstance objects by parsing each registration's secure metadata with a strict Boolean conversion. A principal that can register a Consul service can supply a secure value other than true or false, causing an exception that aborts construction of the entire instance list and makes the targeted service undiscoverable; when GetAllInstancesAsync enumerates all services, one malformed instance can abort enumeration across every service.

Steeltoe in versions from 4.0.0 until 4.3.0, in EurekaDiscoveryClient, deserializes the registry response as one unit, so an unrecognized actionType or status, a non-Boolean isCoordinatingDiscoveryServer, or a nonnumeric timestamp can abort the entire response. A principal that can register or update an instance can cause all connected Steeltoe clients to receive an empty or stale instance list until the malformed registration is removed.

In Steeltoe before version 4.3.0, the /actuator/httpexchanges endpoint masks only URI user information but does not inspect query strings. When IncludeQueryString is enabled, the response can disclose OAuth tokens, password-reset tokens, signed-URL signatures, API keys, and other query-string secrets from prior traffic. The endpoint's DEBUG logger also records these URIs, creating a second disclosure channel.