Refitter vulnerabilities

In Refitter prior to 2.1.2, the header parameter name in parameters[].name with in: header is emitted verbatim into a Refit [Header("<name>")] attribute string without escaping quotation marks. An attacker-influenced OpenAPI description can pass default validation without --skip-validation and break out of the parameter-list position, generating valid C# with a file class and [ModuleInitializer] method that executes attacker code when the compiled assembly is loaded.

Refitter prior to 2.1.2 emits OpenAPI `paths` object keys verbatim into Refit route attributes without escaping quotation marks. A crafted single-line, slash-prefixed path can close the attribute, interface, and namespace and inject a top-level class with a `[ModuleInitializer]` method that executes attacker code when the generated assembly is loaded. The issue is fixed in version 2.1.2.

Refitter prior to 2.1.2 emits content-type keys from `requestBody/responses` content maps verbatim into a Refit `[Headers(...)]` attribute string without escaping quotation marks. A crafted content-type key in an OpenAPI description can break out of the attribute, interface, and namespace and inject a top-level class with a `[ModuleInitializer]` method that executes attacker code when the generated assembly is loaded. The issue is fixed in version 2.1.2.

In the refitter dotnet tool prior to 2.1.1, NJsonSchema is invoked with unsafe $ref resolution defaults when generating Refit interfaces from attacker-controlled OpenAPI descriptions. Remote http(s) references cause requests from the developer or CI host and inline untrusted content, while absolute local paths and ../ traversal allow arbitrary local-file disclosure. The chain stops at SSRF, remote file inclusion, and local file inclusion, not code execution.