Pocket ID vulnerabilities

From 1.11.0 until 2.10.0, createTokenFromClientCredentials in backend/internal/service/oidc_service.go accepts the client-controlled resource parameter and embeds it directly in the access token aud claim without validating that the audience is registered or that the requesting client may access it. Any authenticated OIDC client can therefore obtain a Pocket ID-signed token naming another client or an arbitrary audience.

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification binds an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true.

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.6.0 until 2.9.0, the client-side path in authorize does not block all dangerous URL schemes and does not invoke the backend callback allow-list validation, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to redirect a victim browser to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS origin for phishing or OIDC error and state smuggling. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.