Omni vulnerabilities

In Omni (which manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud) from 1.3.0 until 1.6.6 and 1.7.3, importing a standalone Talos cluster creates an ImportedClusterSecrets resource containing the cluster's complete CA secrets bundle. The access rules in internal/backend/runtime/omni/state_access.go allow an authenticated user with the Reader role to retrieve the resource through ResourceService if the importing actor has not rotated those secrets, exposing Kubernetes, Talos, and etcd CA private keys plus the service-account key. The issue is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.3.

In Omni before versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.3, managementServer.CreateSchematic in internal/backend/grpc/schematics.go passes the caller-controlled TalosVersion field to imageFactoryClient.OverlaysVersions without validating it as a version. An authenticated Operator can submit traversal segments in TalosVersion, which url.URL.JoinPath normalizes into unintended paths on the configured image-factory host. Omni then issues HTTP GET requests to those paths and reflects error-body content, enabling same-host endpoint probing and possible disclosure of internal diagnostics.

In Omni before 1.6.6 and from 1.7.0 until 1.7.3, SAML.getSession in internal/pkg/auth/interceptor/saml.go checks SAMLAssertion.Used and marks it used in separate state operations. Concurrent requests carrying the same captured saml-session token can each observe the assertion as unused and obtain authentication as the victim before either update is visible. The issue is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.3.