Hulumi vulnerabilities

hulumi before v1.3.2 contain a deployment SCP template that allows tag-on-create bypasses for hulumi:iac-role protections. Attackers can bypass intended IAM boundary restrictions by exploiting the weakened SCP template in downstream deployments.

A privilege escalation vulnerability in hulumi before v1.3.2 exists in the weekly integration IAM policy, allowing role lifecycle operations on af-e2e-* roles without sufficient boundary restrictions. Attackers with the documented principal can create persistent higher-privilege roles in the sandbox account.

Hulumi versions before v1.3.2 resolve the threat-model helper script from an unsafe root, allowing workspace files to shadow the intended helper script. Attackers can place malicious files in the workspace to execute arbitrary code during local skill execution.

Hulumi prior to version 1.4.0 contains a vulnerability where AccountFoundation reuse paths silently downgrade GuardDuty / Security Hub posture. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.

In Hulumi prior to version 1.4.0, drift detection in CI/cron could silently cache transient adapter failures as 'all clear', masking real attacks for up to six hours, or falsely escalate ordinary provider-version churn to incident severity.

In Hulumi prior to version 1.4.0, users of AccountFoundation could deploy an AWS account whose CloudTrail/Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal, despite the startup-hardened tier guaranteeing tamper-resistance. Sandbox deployments had no audit immutability.

In Hulumi prior to version 1.4.0, there is a bypass via decoy sibling resources targeting a different bucket.

In Hulumi prior to version 1.4.0, policy packs can be bypassed by a forged Pulumi-URN logical name.

In Hulumi prior to version 1.4.0, IAM-role policy checks can be bypassed when the role trusts multiple OIDC providers.