HortusFox vulnerabilities

HortusFox (hortusfox-web) through 6.3 contains an unrestricted file upload vulnerability in PlantAttachmentModel that allows authenticated users to store files with client-supplied extensions under public/attachments/. Attackers can upload HTML or SVG files via /plants/attachments/add for stored cross-site scripting, or PHP files where .htaccess is unenforced to execute code.

HortusFox (hortusfox-web) before 6.2 contains an SQL injection vulnerability that allows API token holders to inject SQL by supplying crafted include_info values to the /api/locations/list endpoint. Attackers can place subqueries in include_info, which PlantsModel::getSpecificInfo() concatenates into the column list, to read any database table including user password hashes.

HortusFox before 6.2 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in ThemeModule::startImport() where an uploaded ZIP archive is extracted directly into the public web root before any validation of file names, extensions, or content is performed. An authenticated administrator can upload a crafted theme archive containing a PHP file and an .htaccess file to re-enable execution, then request it under the themes directory to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web-server user.

A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in HortusFox 5.9 allows authenticated workspace members to inject persistent JavaScript into plant notes via Parsedown rendered without safe mode. Notes are rendered unescaped in the browser of every user who views the affected plant. An attacker can steal session cookies or perform actions in the context of other users including administrators.