Growatt ShineLan-X vulnerabilities

The authentication mechanism on the web interface is not properly implemented. It is possible to bypass authentication checks by crafting a POST request with new settings since there is no session token or authentication in place. This would allow an attacker to point the device to an arbitrary address for domain name resolution, e.g., to facilitate a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack.

The SWD debug interface on the Growatt ShineLan-X communication dongle is available by default, allowing an attacker to attain debug access to the device and to extract secrets or domains from within the device.

Growatt ShineLan-X communication dongle has an undocumented backup account with undocumented credentials which allows significant level access to the device, such as allowing any attacker to access the Setting Center. This means that this is effectively a backdoor for all devices utilizing a Growatt ShineLan-X communication dongle.

Encryption is missing on the configuration interface for Growatt ShineLan-X and MIC 3300TL-X. This allows an attacker with access to the network to intercept and potentially manipulate communication requests between the inverter and its cloud endpoint.

ShineLan-X contains a set of credentials for an FTP server found within the firmware, allowing testers to establish an insecure FTP connection with the server. This may allow an attacker to replace legitimate files being deployed to devices with their own malicious versions, since the firmware signature verification is not enforced.