Frogman vulnerabilities

In Frogman prior to version 1.6.3, users with PERM_READ access could call sensitive API functions, exposing AMI secrets, outbound dial PINs, Asterisk dialplan contexts, SSH commands, backup paths, CDR history, and raw AMI dumps with SIP fields (passwords, md5_cred, oauth_secret).

In Frogman prior to version 1.6.2, the fm_dialplan_apply function accepted template parameters (greeting, dest, url, extension, code, file) without proper sanitization, allowing a PERM_WRITE caller with confirm:true to inject arbitrary Asterisk directives such as System(), Set(SHELL(...)), Goto, or Macro. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.2.

Frogman prior to 1.6.6 has a vulnerability in its chat Markdown formatter – it inserts raw regex capture groups as HTML. User-controlled fields (e.g., extension names, IVR descriptions) can carry JavaScript payloads that execute when an admin views the response.

A vulnerability in Frogman before version 1.6.2 causes plaintext password and secret leakage. The fm_reset_password and fm_add_extension functions return credentials that are then stored in the audit log (oc_audit_log.detail) as JSON. Any user with PERM_READ permission and access to fm_audit_search can recover the stored credentials.

Frogman prior to version 1.6.2 stored API tokens as raw hex strings and authenticated the X-Frogman-Token header by comparing it with the stored raw value. This allowed reading active tokens, including admin tokens, from the database and reusing them.