DJI drones vulnerabilities

DJI drones contain an FTP service with hardcoded credentials shared across affected models, allowing authenticated users to upload files without limits and overwrite files in **/blackbox/upgrade/**. An attacker with network or USB RNDIS access can exhaust storage, preventing flight records and firmware updates. Uploaded files persist across reboot and factory reset.

DJI drones transmit DUML protocol messages over BLE without encryption. During Wi-Fi client connection or QuickTransfer mode, the DJI Fly app exchanges Wi-Fi credentials (PSK, SSID, UUID) over BLE. An attacker within BLE range can passively sniff this traffic and recover the credentials in cleartext.

The HTTP media server on DJI drones does not enforce sufficient limits on incoming connections or request rates. An attacker with access to the drone's internal network can exhaust the server's connection pool by repeatedly requesting a stored media file, preventing the server from handling legitimate requests and causing a denial of service that prevents the DJI Fly application from retrieving photos and videos from the aircraft in QuickTransfer mode. Remediation requires a firmware update from the vendor.

DJI drones expose an unauthenticated DUML command interface over Bluetooth, allowing an attacker within range to modify Wi-Fi parameters, including SSID, PSK, MAC address, country code, and channel. This can lead to drone control takeover or DoS.

The HTTP media server on DJI drones serves stored photos and videos through the `/v2` endpoint without authenticating the requesting client. Filenames follow a predictable pattern, allowing an attacker who joins the drone's internal network to enumerate valid filenames and exfiltrate stored photos and videos. The exposed media may reveal sensitive information, including private locations, property, travel history, identifiable individuals, and the operator's routines.