Archive::Tar vulnerabilities

Archive::Tar versions before 3.08 for Perl extract symlinks with attacker controlled targets outside the extraction directory. _make_special_file() passes the tar header's linkname to symlink() without validating it against absolute paths or .. segments. The secure-extract mode check that guards regular file extraction does not cover the symlink target. A subsequent open through the extracted name reads or writes the attacker chosen path.

In the Archive::Tar library for Perl versions before 3.10, memory exhaustion is possible via an attacker-controlled entry size field in the tar header. The _read_tar() function allocates a scalar based on the header size without an upper bound.

A vulnerability in Archive::Tar for Perl before version 3.08 allows extraction of hardlinks to attacker-controlled paths outside the extraction directory. The _make_special_file() function passes the tar header's linkname to link() without validating absolute paths or '..' segments, creating a hardlink to the victim file. A subsequent write through the extracted name modifies the victim file, and the _extract_file() block (guarded only against symlinks) applies permissions, owner, and timestamps to the shared inode.