Apache Polaris vulnerabilities

Apache Polaris is supposed to issue short-lived GCS credentials that only work for one table's files, but a crafted namespace or table name can cause those credentials to work across the configured bucket.

Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it later builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those same characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns.

Apache Polaris can issue broad temporary ('vended') storage credentials during staged table creation before the effective table location has been validated or durably reserved. An attacker can choose a reachable target location, leading to unauthorized access to table data and metadata.

Apache Polaris allows an authenticated principal with permission to create or update Iceberg table properties to set FileIO client settings such as s3.endpoint in table metadata. In versions < 1.8.0, Polaris may use these settings to construct its server-side FileIO client, potentially redirecting storage traffic to a host chosen by the table writer and exposing authentication material.

Apache Polaris did not consistently validate storage locations supplied during table and view registration. An authenticated principal with registration permissions could cause Polaris to use the catalog's storage credentials to read a caller-selected Iceberg metadata file before verifying it was within allowed locations, potentially disclosing limited information. Polaris could also accept registration metadata with references to external locations, but this did not cause reads.